Research papers
1988 · Cambridge University Press eBooks · 33,006 citations
Introduction Expected utility theory has dominated the analysis of decision making under risk. It has been generally accepted as a normative model of rational choice (Keeney and Raiffa, 1976), and widely applied as a descriptive model of economic behavior (e.g., Friedman and Savage, 1948, and Arrow, 1971). Thus, it is assumed that all reasonable people would wish to obey the axioms of the theory (von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944, and Savage, 1954), and that most people actually do, most of the time. The present paper describes several classes of choice problems in which preferences systematically violate the axioms of expected utility theory. In the light of these observations we argue that utility theory, as it is commonly interpreted and applied, is not an adequate descriptive model and we propose an alternative account of choice under risk. Critique Decision making under risk can be viewed as a choice between prospects or gambles. A prospect ( x 1 , p 1 ; …; x n , p n ) is a contract that yields outcome x i with probability p i , where p 1 + p 2 + … + p n = 1. To simplify notation, we omit null outcomes and use ( x, p ) to denote the prospect ( x, p ; 0, 1 – p ) that yields x with probability p and 0 with probability 1 – p . The (riskless) prospect that yields x with certainty is denoted by ( x ). The present discussion is restricted to prospects with so-called objective or standard probabilities.
1980 · Journal of Marketing Research · 9,932 citations
A model is proposed which expresses consumer satisfaction as a function of expectation and expectancy disconfirmation. Satisfaction, in turn, is believed to influence attitude change and purchase i...
1980 · Journal of Marketing Research · 7,605 citations
A model is proposed which expresses consumer satisfaction as a function of expectation and expectancy disconfirmation. Satisfaction, in turn, is believed to influence attitude change and purchase intention. Results from a two-stage field study support the scheme for consumers and nonconsumers of a flu inoculation.
1991 · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · 6,495 citations
Much experimental evidence indicates that choice depends on the status quo or reference level: changes of reference point often lead to reversals of preference. We present a reference-dependent theory of consumer choice, which explains such effects by a deformation of indifference curves about the reference point. The central assumption of the theory is that losses and disadvantages have greater impact on preferences than gains and advantages. Implications of loss aversion for economic behavior are considered.
· The Journal of the Abraham Lincoln Association · 4,203 citations
Abstract Recent empirical research in finance has uncovered two families of pervasive regularities: underreaction of stock prices to news such as earnings announcements, and overreaction of stock prices to a series of good or bad news. In this paper, we present a parsimonious model of investor sentiment, or of how investors form beliefs, which is consistent with the empirical findings. The model is based on psychological evidence and produces both underreaction and overreaction for a wide range of parameter values.